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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review adjudications of the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2-2 of the Utah Code. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES-
RULES OR REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a divorce proceeding involving the paternity of a child, Zachary, born during 
the marriage of Kelly and Kimberlee Pearson, and the custody of both Zachary and his 
brother, Nicholas. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Courts Below 
Respondent Kelly F. Pearson ("Father") commenced divorce proceedings in 
December 2000 (R.1). Intervenor Pete D. Thanos ("Thanos") moved to intervene in the 
proceedings on January 23,2001, claiming to be the biological father of Zachary, one of the 
children born of the marriage (R.37). Concurrently, petitioner Kimberlee Y. Pearson 
("Mother") filed a motion requesting that Father be declared to be not the father of Zachary, 
and without visitation rights in Zachary. She also requested temporary custody of both 
Nicholas and Zachary (R.32). Father opposed both motions and requested that temporary 
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custody of the children be awarded to him (R.56). All three motions were heard by 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans on February 8,2001 (R.122). 
At the hearing, Mother attempted to proffer testimony that Father was not Zachary's 
father. Father's objections on the basis of Lord Mansfield's Rule were sustained. Mother 
then stipulated that custody should continue as it had since the Pearsons' separation, 
namely, that she and Father should continue to share joint legal and physical custody of 
Nicholas and Zachary, with the children splitting their time with each parent equally (R.122). 
The stipulation was accepted by the court and reduced to order (R.133). 
On August 1,2001, Thanos renewed his motion to intervene (R.165), which Father 
again opposed (R.222). The motion was heard by Commissioner Evans on August 30, 
2001 (R.248). Commissioner Evans found that Thanos had not acknowledged his paternity 
of Zachary for more than two years, though he was aware of and believed himself to be 
Zachary's biological father, and that Thanos kept his biological connection to Zachary 
hidden from others, including his wife of twenty-six years, allowing Zachary to be regarded 
as Father's son and to become closely bonded with Father during critical stages of 
Zachary's development. Commissioner Evans further found that Thanos had not had 
substantial contact with Zachary prior to the initiation of the litigation, that he had not lived 
with Zachary in the same household or established a parent-child bond with Zachary, that 
he was completely absent from Zachary's life for the first year and a half and had only 
incidental contact with him thereafter, that during Thanos's absence Zachary had developed 
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critical bonds with his primary caregivers, Father and Mother, and that to permit Thanos to 
now be introduced as Zachary's father would be disruptive to the child's stability. Based on 
the foregoing, Commissioner Evans concluded that Thanos did not have standing to 
challenge the presumption of paternity in favor of Father and that he did not have a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in establishing his paternity of Zachary. The 
Commissioner's findings and recommendation were subsequently reduced to order (R.671). 
Mother and Thanos objected (R.257, R.400). 
The trial court heard argument on Mother's and Thanos's objections on December 3, 
2001 (R.684). After taking the matter under advisement, the court in a telephone 
conference indicated it needed additional information to adequately address the policy 
considerations set forth in StatelnreJ.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) ("Schoolcraft"). 
Therefore, the court appointed Dr. Jill Sanders "to provide the court with an independent 
'Schoolcraft evaluation (R.728).'" 
Dr. Sanders completed a written report on May 13,2002 (R.860). She stated in the 
report that "Kelly Pearson functioned as Zachary's father prior to and following his birth in 
September 1999 Zachary identifies Kelly as his father and their attachment is secure, 
strong and healthy." (R.862,1f 2.) She further stated that Thanos's contact with Zachary 
was minimal until January of 2001, when he began to see Zachary once or twice a month, 
that "Zachary identifies Peter as 'Peter'", and that he perceives him to be a familiar 
"caregiver" (R.862,J 3). 
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Dr. Sanders went on to opine that "[m]ost adopted children spend considerable time 
and energy thinking about their biological parents, if not actively seeking to locate them" and 
that "psychologically speaking, some relationship between a biological parent and their child 
is necessary for the child's normal development." Id. at 4, fl 4. In this sense, she concluded, 
"the relationship between Peter and Zachary is essential." Id. 
Without addressing the question whether disestablishing Father as Zachary's father 
would be disruptive to Zachary, Dr. Sanders stated that "[tfhere is no research that I am 
aware of that suggests having two positive father figures has a detrimental impact on a 
child" and expressed her view that "Zachary has the opportunity to experience two positive, 
important relationships with the two fathers in his life." Id. at 5, fl 2. She concluded, in 
summary, that "[f]rom a developmental and psychological perspective, Zachary's functioning 
is not inherently disrupted by Peter's involvement and Peter's relationship with Zachary is 
necessary to Zachary's normal and positive development." Id. at 5,1f 4. 
Upon receiving Dr. Sanders' report, Father requested that Dr. Sanders address the 
impact on Zachary of a disruption in the parent-child relationship between Father and 
Zachary, which she had not done. Dr. Sanders refused to do so. Father therefore 
requested a telephone conference with the court, which was held May 28,2002 (R.847). 
The trial court permitted Father to outline his concerns in a letter to the court, which he did 
(R.876). Dr. Sanders responded with a letter stating that she intended to address the 
issues raised by Father in the custody evaluation and did not deem it necessary to address 
4 
them in the context of the "Schoolcraft evaluation" (Ex. 1-3). The trial court subsequently 
requested Dr. Sanders to address the issues raised by Father, and she responded to this 
request with a letter dated August 26,2002 (R.865). In the letter, Dr. Sanders stated: 
"Zachary's emotional security would likely be significantly disrupted in the case of severely 
limited or complete loss of contact with [Father] Obviously the way to protect Zachary 
from additional disruption is to maintain his relationship with [Father]." (R.866, ffl[ 2-3.) 
Dr. Sanders went on to state: "I do not believe Zachary has lost' his relationship 
with [Father]. To the contrary, their relationship is a strong and positive parent-child 
attachment There is no basis to believe that further disruption to the relationship 
between Zachary and [Father] is intrinsically linked to [Thanos's] presence in Zachary's life." 
id., If 5. Thereafter, the matter was submitted for decision (R.857). 
After one-hour oral argument on October 1,2002, and without taking testimony, but 
relying solely on the affidavits and written reports previously filed with the court, the trial 
court granted Thanos's motion to intervene (R.894). The trial court instructed counsel for 
Thanos to "prepare the Order consistent with the Court's ruling" (R.894), but instead 
counsel submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.975), and a separate order 
(R.971), which were signed over petitioner's objection on November 7,2002 (R.933). 
The matter was subsequently set for a six-day trial on the issues of custody, alimony 
and attorney fees. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court took the matter under 
advisement, subsequently issuing written findings of fact (R. 2434) and entering a 
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supplemental decree of divorce (R.2503). Based on its previous paternity ruling, the court 
concluded that Father was a non-parent competing for custody of Zachary vis-a-vis 
Zachary's parents, and he was therefore required to rebut the parental presumption. As to 
Mother, the court found that Father had not done so, and thus "[Mother] benefits from the 
Parental Presumption on her claim for custody of Zachary against [Father]. Consequently, 
[Mother] and [Father] are not on equal footing." (R.2452). 
As to Thanos, the court found: "The Parental Presumption has been rebutted 
regarding [Thanos's] claim for custody of Zachary. During approximately the first 15 months 
of Zachary's life, [Thanos], with the assistance of [Mother and Father], kept [Thanos's] 
parentage of Zachary a secret resulting in minimal contact between Zachary and [Thanos] 
during this period. During this critical 15-month period of time, [Thanos] and Zachary 
generally did not have a strong mutual bond, during this time [Thanos] did not demonstrate 
a willingness to sacrifice his own interests and welfare for Zachary, and generally lacked the 
sympathy for and understanding of Zachary that is characteristic of parents generally. 
Therefore, [Father] and [Thanos] stand on equal foot and Zachary's custody between them 
is determined solely by the best interests of the child." (R.2452). 
Additionally, the trial court found, "In the context of the Parental Presumption 
Analysis, it is ironic at best to conclude that [Father] is a non-parent of Zachary when in real 
terms [Father] has established a strong mutual parental bond and relationship with Zachary, 
albeit in loco parentis. The Utah Supreme Court deemed Mr. Hutchison to be a 'non-parent' 
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in its analysis and Mr. Hutchison's parental relationship was of longer duration than 
[Father's] in the present case. 649 P.2d at 39. Consequently, following the dictates of the 
Hutchison case and in furtherance of the policies which support the Parental Presumption, 
the Court ruled accordingly." (R.2452-53). 
Adopting the recommendations set forth in Dr. Jill Sanders' custody evaluation, the 
trial court awarded joint legal custody of Zachary to Mother and Thanos, denying Father 
legal custody rights in Zachary, and joint legal custody of Nicholas to Father and Mother 
(R.2467). The court designated Mother and Thanos primary physical custodians of 
Zachary, and Mother primary physical custodian of Nicholas. Father was awarded "third 
party access" to Zachary and his 50/50 access schedule, in place since the parties' 
separation, was reduced. Father and Mother's 50/50 access schedule with Nicholas 
remained unchanged (R. 2459; R.2467; R.2504, fl 4). Father's physical access schedule 
with both Nicholas and Zachary was made contingent upon Father relocating to Oregon 
(R.2505,1f 6; R.2507, f 7). 
Statement of Facts 
Father and Mother were married in Salt Lake City, Utah on August 17,1992. Their 
first son, Nicholas, was born July 6,1997. Unbeknownst to Father, commencing in 1996 
and continuing thereafter through Nicholas's birth and infancy, and Zachary's conception, 
Mother was involved romantically with Thanos (R.74, fflf 4-6). Thanos was also married at 
the time, and Mother and Thanos concealed their relationship from their respective spouses 
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(R.74, fflj 4-6). Mother became pregnant towards the end of 1998. In January 1999 she 
told Thanos that she believed the child was his. Thanos refused to leave his wife and was 
unwilling to be known or recognized as the child's father (R.2535, at 961:14 - 962:25; R.74, 
UK 4-6). 
Thereafter, in late March 1999, Mother told Father of the pregnancy and of the 
affair. She was four months pregnant by this time (R.2532, at 433:1; R.45,1f 4). When 
Mother told Father that she was pregnant, she stated that she believed Thanos was the 
child's biological father. Father and Mother then discussed the viability of their marriage, 
and Mother stated that she must decide whether to stay with Father or to leave the 
marriage. She asked Father whether, if she stayed, he would rear the child as his own, 
making no distinction between him and their older son. Father affirmed that he would 
(R.2532, at 433:12 - 435:2; R.1570, If 4). 
The following day after this discussion took place, Mother told Father that she had 
decided she would stay and make their marriage work (R.2532, at 435:3 - 436:8; R.1570, 
ffl[ 4-6). From that point forward, Mother repeatedly confirmed to Father that she 
considered him to be the father of the child she was carrying and that she would treat him 
as such in all respects (R.2533, at 450:8 - 452:8; R.1570, ffl[ 4-6). Mother expressed her 
fear that Father would not treat the child as his own, and she repeatedly asked Father for 
assurance that he would, which Father gave. Id. Mother also confided to Father that 
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Thanos was unwilling to do anything that would reveal the situation to his wife and that he 
wanted the child's paternity to remain secret (R.2533, at 456:5-11; R.1570, fl 4). 
Relying on Mother's repeated representations and assurances, Father took on the 
commitment of fatherhood and was as involved in the pregnancy as a father can be, caring 
for and supporting Mother, attending all prenatal examinations with her, and shouldering 
increased household duties to relieve Mother during the pregnancy (R.2532, at 438:16 -
439:12; R.45,ffl 5-8; R.1570, U 9). 
After the child, Zachary, was born, Mother resumed her full work schedule, leaving 
Father with the lion's share of the responsibility for both Zachary and Nicholas (R.457:2-6). 
She had by this time been working for several months in a high management position for 
the startup company by which she'd been recruited (R.2533, at 459:14). She worked long 
hours during the week, typically leaving by 8:00 a.m. and not returning until 7:00 or 
8:00 p.m. or later. She also worked full days on Saturdays and 4 to 6 hours on Sundays, 
jd. at 457:1-15. Father, on the other hand, consciously stepped back in his career in order 
to care for the children (R.2532, at 431:1-17). He maintained a schedule of working 8:00 
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, and he did not work over-time or weekends 
(R.2533, at 457:20 - 458:4). He was involved in all aspects of the children's care. ]d. at 
458:7 - 459:23. He was the one who took Nicholas to school in the morning, and he was 
the one who arrived home in the evening to relieve the nanny (R.2535, at 1071:11-15). 
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Mother never acted inconsistently with her commitment to Father as Zachary's 
father until this litigation began (R.2533, at 452:12). She listed Father as Zachary's father 
on his birth certificate. The papers were filled out by both Father and Mother together after 
Zachary was born (R.2533, at 453:14 & Ex. P-9; R. 1570,1f 9 & 1580). Father chose 
Zachary's given name because Mother had chosen Nicholas's given name (R.2533, at 
454:4-10). Father and Mother both agreed without question that Zachary's surname would 
be "Pearson" (R. 1570, U10). 
When Zachary was 6 weeks old both Father's family and Mother's family gathered 
to bless Zachary as a member of the LDS Church. It was announced that Kelly Pearson, 
Zachary's father, would give Zachary his name and a blessing, and Father did so with 
members of both families participating. After the blessing, Mother spoke from the pulpit and 
expressed the joy that she felt to welcome Zachary into their family. Mother completed the 
form for Zachary's Blessing Certificate, signed by the Pearsons' bishop, stating that Father 
is Zachary's father and that he blessed him (R. 2533, at 454:11 - 455:23 & Ex. P-10; 
R.1570,1f 11 & R.1581, R.1582). The Pearson's church membership record confirms that 
Zachary was "born in the covenant" and is therefore sealed to Father as his father for all 
time and eternity (R.1570, H12 & R.1583). 
Even after Father and Mother separated and Mother moved from the Pearsons' 
marital home in May 2000, she continued to act consistently with her repeated 
representations to Father that she considered him to be Zachary's father. She left both 
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Zachary and Nicholas with Father while she established herself in a new residence, and 
thereafter acquiesced in Father caring for both children in the home during the day while 
she worked. She established jointly with Father a 50/50 time-sharing schedule to care for 
Nicholas and Zachary, which continued through September of 2004, at which point the trial 
court's time-sharing schedule took effect (R.2434, at 16, fl 34.d; R. 1570, fl 13). 
It was not until January 2001, when divorce proceedings commenced, that Mother 
changed her position regarding Father's paternity of Zachary. At that time she filed a 
motion with the court asking that the court declare that Father was not Zachary's father and 
that he had no rights of custody or visitation in Zachary (R.32). 
Nevertheless, while taking this position in court papers, respondent continued to 
represent Father as Zachary's father in public forums and to acquiesce in his ongoing 
assumption of the role of Zachary's father. At Zachary's pre-school, which Zachary started 
in the Fall of 2002, respondent listed Zachary's home phone as "Dad - 467-8923", Father 
home phone, and his grandparents as "Velda and Wayne", Father's parents (R.1570, If 15 & 
R.1587). Father is listed as Zachary's father at work, at Zachary's school, on the church 
records, and in this state's vital records (R.1570, K14 & R. 1580-91). 
Thanos also acquiesced in Father's assumption of the role of Zachary's father. 
Knowing of Zachary's existence before even petitioner did, and believing himself to be 
Zachary's father from the time he learned of Mother's pregnancy in January 1999, he 
allowed petitioner to assume that role for two full years, doing nothing to acknowledge his 
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paternity (R.2535, at 963:1; R.671, If 9). He felt that he would be "Uncle Pete" to Zachary 
rather than father, yet he acquiesced in that occurring (R.2535, at 964:8-16; R.2536, at 
1302:21 -1303:21; R.449, at 2, fl4). He kept his biological connection to Zachary hidden 
from others, including his family members, until as late as August 2001 (R. 671, f 9). 
Despite his belief and knowledge that he was Zachary's biological father, Thanos allowed 
Zachary to be regarded in every way as Father's son and to become closely bonded with 
Father during critical stages of Zachary's development, jd.; R.2452-53. 
Thanos's desire to keep Zachary's parentage secret also resulted in minimal 
contact between Zachary and Thanos during these critical stages (R.2452). During the first 
year of Zachary's life, Thanos saw him twice, each time about an hour (R.2535, at 964:17-
21). During the second year of Zachary's life, until February 2001, he saw him two to three 
times (R.2535, at 964:22-25). 
On December 25,2000, Thanos's wife died (R.2533, at 635:20). Beginning in 
February 2001, Thanos began to have contact with Zachary and Nicholas during the 
periods of time that the children were in Mother's custody (R.2437, fl 9). Zachary was 
seventeen months old by this time. The contact consisted of approximately the equivalent 
of standard visitation for a noncustodial parent (R.2534, at 716:8). Intervenor continued to 
live in Oregon through the time of trial (R.2437, fl 8). 
Nicholas and Zachary make no distinction between themselves in their relationship 
with Thanos, identifying him as step-father and calling him "Pete" (R.2535, at 950). To both 
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children, Thanos is a stepparent, not a parent (R.2534, at 711:17). Nor do Nicholas and 
Zachary make any distinction between themselves in their relationship with Father, 
identifying him as their father and calling him "Dad" (R.2434, at 19). Nicholas and Zachary's 
primary attachment figures are Father and Mother (R.2534, at 715:11,716:18). They have 
a "secondary" attachment to Thanos (R.2534, at 716:14). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals was not required to defer to the trial court's application of the 
facts bearing on the standing inquiry in this case, nor to the trial court's findings of fact, as 
the former analysis involves policy questions and legal conclusions that are the proper 
province of the appellate courts, and the latter were based on the trial court's review of the 
written record only, which the Court of Appeals was equally well situated to review. 
The Court of Appeals did not err in applying the standing analysis set forth by this 
Court in State In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) ("Schoolcraft") to the facts of this 
case. The Court of Appeals properly took a broader view of the policy concern of protecting 
marriage than was taken by the trial court - concluding that the policy concern did not lose 
all relevance simply because the Pearsons' marriage ultimately dissolved. This is 
particularly so in light of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, enacted in this state in 2005, 
which departs from the Uniform Act by denying standing to adjudicate the paternity of a 
marital child to anyone but the husband or wife, even in the context of divorce proceedings. 
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Thanos does not have a constitutionally protected right to establish his paternity of a 
child born into Father's marriage. Even if he did have such a constitutionally protected right, 
he waived it by failing to timely assert it. 
The Court of Appeals' references to the findings of the trial court in its October 2001 
order were immaterial to its opinion. The essential findings - though not the conclusions -
were subsequently confirmed by Dr. Sanders' reports. The Court of Appeals correctly relied 
on the findings contained in Dr. Sanders' reports, rejecting her superfluous conclusions, in 
applying the policy concern of protecting children from disruptive attacks on their paternity. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion is not ambiguous in its implications for the trial court's 
custody determinations in this case, and on remand the trial court should be instructed that 
Father is entitled to a new custody evaluation and a new custody trial, free from the 
inclusion of an improper third party and based on proper custody factors, not "biology." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED THE POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT IN SCHOOLCRAFT 
Mother and Thanos (collectively "Petitioners") articulate numerous reasons why they 
feel the Court of Appeals "wholly disregarded" the policy considerations articulated by this 
Court in InreJ.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) ("Schoolcraft") and should be reversed. 
Petitioners' arguments do not accurately convey the court of appeals' opinion, slant the 
record facts, cite facts inapposite to the Schoolcraft analysis, and assume erroneous 
standards of review. Father responds to the arguments advanced by Petitioners as follows. 
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A. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err In Its Review of Thanos's 
Standing to Challenge Zacharv's Paternity, Nor In Its Review of 
the Facts Bearing on This Issue 
Petitioners argue, in relation to several substantive points, that the Court of Appeals 
erroneously substituted its own findings of fact for findings of the trial court. Petitioners cite 
Willev v. Willev. 951 P.2d 226,234 (Utah 1997), an alimony case in which the trial court 
made findings of fact after trial, in support of this argument. The principle articulated in 
Willev - that the appellate court must not usurp the prerogative of the trial court and make 
its own independent determinations - does not apply in this case. 
The Court of Appeals addressed only one issue raised in Father's appeal, namely, 
whether the trial court erred in the standing analysis it employed in granting Thanos's 
motion to intervene. As this Court has stated, "The question of whether a given individual or 
association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law, although 
there may be factual findings that bear on the issue." Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson. 
946 P.2d 372,373 (Utah 1997). The standing determination implicates important policy 
considerations, as to which trial courts are granted minimal discretion, jd. at 374; cf. State 
v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278,281 (Utah 1994) (determining normative consequence of 
particular facts is the province of appellate courts). Thus, in contrast to Willev where the 
trial court was entitled to "considerable discretion" in fashioning an alimony award, see 
Willev v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226,234 (Utah 1997), the trial court's determinations regarding 
the important policy considerations implicated in this case were not entitled to deference. 
15 
Moreover, the trial court's factual findings pertaining to the issue of standing - while 
normally entitled to deference, see Kearns-Tribune Corp.. 946 P.2d at 373-74 - were not 
entitled to deference in this case. This is because the trial court decided the question of 
standing based solely on the affidavits and legal memoranda filed by the parties and the 
reports submitted by Dr. Sanders. The trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, 
receive testimony, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, nor make findings resolving 
conflicting testimony. Thus, the Court of Appeals was in as good a position as the trial court 
to read the affidavits and reports, evaluate the evidence, and draw logical conclusions 
therefrom. See Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333,336-37 & n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The 
Court of Appeals was not required to defer to the trial court's findings on the motion to 
intervene, see In re Infant Anonymous. 760 P.2d 916,918 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and was 
instead entitled to review the facts pertaining to the motion to intervene de novo. See 
Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc.. 758 P.2d 460,461 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Petitioners' oft-repeated contention that the Court of Appeals did not properly defer to the 
trial court's findings and/or substituted findings of its own is grounded in a misapprehension 
of the foregoing principles and should be disregarded.1 
1
 Petitioners also attempt to dispute "findings" made by the Court of Appeals by citation to 
testimony adduced at trial. However, the motion for intervention was granted nearly two 
years prior to trial and conclusively disposed of the standing issue. At no time did the trial 
court take evidence or receive testimony prior to ruling on the motion for intervention, nor, 
clearly did the trial court rely on testimony adduced at trial two years later to make its ruling. 
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B. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Its Application of the Policy 
Consideration of "Preserving the Stability of the Marriage" 
1. The Court of Appeals appropriately took a broad view of the 
policy goal of preserving marriage. 
Neither Schoolcraft, nor any other reported case in this jurisdiction, has involved a 
challenge to the paternity of a child born into the marriage of a husband and wife who, 
believing the child is not the issue of the husband, agree that the husband will rear the child 
as his own as a condition of reconciling and continuing the marriage. The Court of Appeals 
did not err in determining that, under these facts, the policy consideration of preserving the 
stability of marriage does not lose all relevance, even though the particular marriage at 
issue had since dissolved. 
In making this determination, the Court of Appeals did not "find" that the Pearsons' 
marriage was intact, nor that a stable marriage between them existed, nor that Thanos was 
"at fault" in undermining the Pearsons' marital relationship, as petitioners claim. Rather, the 
Court of Appeals explicitly recognized that the Pearsons' marriage eventually dissolved. 
See Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, U 21. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals 
properly recognized the importance of the Pearsons' efforts to reconcile and to jointly rear 
Zachary as the child of their marriage, both prior to and after their separation. 
In the context of this case, the policy of protecting marriage takes on broader 
implications than were present in Schoolcraft. The Pearsons, unlike Mr. Schoolcraft and his 
wife, who lived together for eight months and separated before any children were born of 
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their union, lived together for eight years and jointly participated in the rearing of two 
children. They subsequently separated, but continued to rear both of the children of their 
marriage jointly, albeit in separate households. The Pearsons' was not a marriage "in name 
only." As noted by the Florida Court of Appeals, "although divorce may separate and strain 
a family with children, divorce does not end the important child-rearing functions of the 
family." S.D. v. A.G.and J.G.. 764 So. 2d 807,810 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000). 
The presumption of legitimacy protects not only the tranquility of an existing marriage 
and the legitimacy of children born into a marriage, but also the sanctity of parent-child 
relationships that develop in the context of marriage. From the standpoint of the child born 
into a marriage, the protection that is afforded by the presumption of legitimacy does not 
depend on the continued existence of the marriage, but to the contrary, acquires particular 
relevance when the marriage dissolves. Our sister state so recognized in In re Marriage of 
Freeman. 53 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), where the court emphasized: "The state's 
interest in applying the [conclusive] presumption [that the husband is the father of children 
born into his marriage] is not limited to assuring adequate support for a child or protecting 
existing marriages from interference. Rather, as we have noted, the state has a well-
recognized interest in preserving and protecting the dignity of parental relationships, 
especially when a marriage is being dissolved and instability is being introduced into a 
child's life." Jd. at 448: see also Susan H. v. Jack S.. 30 Cal. App. 4* 1435,1442-1443 
(1994)("The state has an 'interest in preserving and protecting the developed parent-child 
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and sibling relationships which give young children social and emotional strength and 
stability.' This interest is served notwithstanding termination of the mother's marital 
relationship with the presumed father."). 
The importance of the marital family as the basic unit of society is grounded in large 
part on the role that marriage plays in nurturing young children. "A child's psychological tie 
to a parent is not a simple, uncomplicated relationship. A child requires from his parents not 
only bodily comfort and gratification, but also demands affection, companionship, and 
stimulating intimacy. Where these needs are answered reliably and regularly by the parent, 
the child-parent relationship becomes firm, with immensely productive effects on the child's 
intellectual and social development. Where there are changes of the parent figure or other 
hurtful interruptions, the child's vulnerability and the fragility of the relationship become 
evident." See In re Marriage of Ross. 783 P.2d 331,338 (Kan. 1989) (citing Goldstein, 
Freud, & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. 17-20) 
Thus, while genetic testing has become scientifically reliable to the extent that even 
the highest standard of proof required to rebut the presumption can be met, courts have 
nevertheless sustained the mandate of privileging the marital family and protecting children 
from disruption of the relationships developed within it. In California, the courts sustained 
the presumption from the attack that it no longer bore a reasonable relationship to the facts 
sought to be presumed by designating it a substantive rule of law. See In re Marriage of 
Freeman. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445 ("'A conclusive presumption is in actuality a substantive 
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rule of law and cannot be said to be unconstitutional unless it transcends such a power of 
the Legislature."') (quoting Kusior v. Silver. 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960)). This Court has also 
recognized that the presumption of legitimacy is grounded not in considerations of fact, but 
in public policy. See Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 407 P.2d 685,692 n.5 (Utah 
1965) ("[T]he so-called absolute presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is 
based on considerations of public policy rather than absolute certainty as to fact."). The 
stability of the parent-child relationships that are formed within marriage are of ongoing 
significance to the well-being of society and as such are entitled to the ongoing protection of 
the state, though the union between the husband and the wife dissolves. 
In this case, the trial court's finding that "the interest in preserving the stability of the 
marriage is not a consideration, due to the fact that there is no marriage to preserve," 
R.983,1f 21, employs an extremely narrow view of the policy goal of preserving marriage. 
Father agreed to reconcile with Mother, and as part of that reconciliation promised to raise 
the child she had conceived of an affair with another man as his own. After having done so, 
and investing emotionally, financially, and in every other way in the child, Mother changed 
her mind, decided she would rather be with Thanos, and asserted that Father had no 
parental rights in the child that he had reared. The trial court endorsed this assertion, 
allowing Thanos standing to disestablish Father as the child's father, and ultimately 
depriving Father of legal custody rights in the child, allowing him only physical access rights 
as a non-parent "third party". Were the trial court's ruling to be upheld, any husband who 
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finds himself in Father's position would be foolish to attempt reconciliation conditioned on a 
promise to rear the child as his own, knowing that the relationship he establishes with the 
child will be at the whim of the wife. Such a policy undermines marriage by discouraging 
reconciliation. Further, such a policy favors the rights of men who invade marriages and 
procreate with the wives of others, thus destabilizing marriages. The policy goal of 
preserving marriage can and should include fashioning rules of law that promote the stability 
of marriage by protecting instead the rights of husbands who attempt to preserve their 
marriages by parenting the children born into them.2 
The Court of Appeals did not err in applying a broader perspective to the policy goal 
of preserving marriage to the facts of this case, disagreeing with the trial court's assumption 
that this policy goal loses all relevance when the particular marriage at issue ends in 
divorce. The stability of marriage is promoted by a rule of law that gives legal protection to 
the parent-child relationship that developed as a condition of the continuation of the 
marriage, and ensuring that that legal protection survives subsequent separation or divorce. 
The dissolution of the marriage between the legal father and the mother "does not change 
the preferred principle, which is to preserve the child's relationship with the social father, if 
2
 The concept that rules of law that protect marriage may have continuing application, even 
though a particular marriage has dissolved, is evident elsewhere in our laws. An example is 
Rule 502 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which protects spousal confidential 
communications after divorce, and even after death. See Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, 
Utah Evidence Law, 5-148 (2nd ed. 2004). The survival of the privilege, encourages open 
communication between spouses, thus protecting and promoting marriage, while having no 
positive benefit in application to the particular marriage that has dissolved. 
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there is one." Ira M. Ellman, Thinking about Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father 
Families, 36 Fam. L.Q. 49,64-65 (2002); see also Susan H. v. Jack S., 30 Cal. App. 4th 
1435,1442-43 (1994); Steven W. v. Matthew S.. 33 Cal. App. 4th 1108,1116-17 (1995) 
(holding that extant father-child relationship should be preserved at cost of biological ties, 
though presumed father's relationship with mother had ended). The Court of Appeals 
merely recognized that these broader implications are legitimately considered when 
analyzing the first policy consideration identified in Schoolcraft. 
2. The Court of Appeals' application of the policy goal of 
preserving marriage is consistent with the policies expressed in 
the Uniform Parentage Act enacted in Utah in 2005. 
Petitioners cite a random selection of dated cases from other jurisdictions in support 
of the false assertion that "it is increasingly apparent that the presumption of paternity rule is 
being further eroded and limited." In fact, the opposite is true, as evidenced by the revisions 
to the Uniform Parentage Act completed by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 2000, as amended in 2002 ("Uniform Act"). The Uniform Act 
incorporates, inter alia, a strict limitations period and the doctrine of estoppel to all 
challenges to the paternity of children having a presumed father. See Uniform Act, §§ 607 
& 608. It thus incorporates legal principles developed by courts throughout the country to 
address complexities arising from social and scientific developments that have resulted in 
an increased need to assign legal paternity where there is knowledge of a divergence 
between social and biological paternity. See Ira Mark Ellman, Thinking about Custody and 
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Support in Ambiguous-Father Families. 36 Fam. L. Q. 49,51-55 (2002). Professor Ellman 
states: 
Legal paternity and biological paternity have never been identical. That was 
once inevitable; today it is a matter of choice. Particularly as policymakers 
have become more determined to enforce child support obligations, the 
choice becomes more important. Even though the law's historic emphasis on 
social paternity owed much to scientific ignorance, it often produced sensible 
results. Those results should not be displaced by our new-found ability to 
establish biological paternity. 
Id. at 77. That sentiment is echoed by the Michigan Supreme Court's holding in In re CAW. 
665 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 2003) that a biological father did not have standing to intervene in a 
child protective proceeding in which the child involved had a legal father. The court stated: 
"There is much that benefits society and, in particular, the children of our state, by a legal 
regime that presumes the legitimacy of children born during a marriage." 
Different legal principles have developed to address the question of legal paternity 
where the social father and the biological father are the not the same. "The key things we 
learn from all these cases . . . is that the rights and obligations of parentage appropriately 
arise from relationships, not just from biology." Ellman, supra, at 65. Schoolcraft, by 
application of a standing analysis that mandates attention to policy considerations protecting 
marriage and children before paternity of a child who has a legal father may be contested, 
simply makes use of one such legal tool. Other states have also employed standing 
analyses, see, e.g.. Ex parte Presse. 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989): Nostrand v. Olivieri. 427 
So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Family Independence Agency v. Jefferson. 677 
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N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2004); Girard v. Waoenmaker. 470 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1991); Evans v. 
Bisson. 970 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1998), have required that a full evidentiary hearing be 
conducted prior to blood tests being ordered or considered or paternity being determined, 
see, e.g., N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000); Fernandez v. McKennev. 776 So. 2d 
1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), have weighed the competing interests at stake per their 
statutory schemes, see, e.g.. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004) or have employed 
estoppel principles, see, e.g.. In re Marriage of Sleeper. 929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). 
The version of the Uniform Act adopted by this State incorporates the foregoing 
principles, and additionally, re-affirms the strong public policy in Utah of protecting marriage 
from outside intervention. Thus, whereas the Uniform Act permits a presumed father, the 
mother, "or another individual" to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed 
father within two years of the child's birth, see Uniform Act § 607(a), the version of the 
Uniform Act adopted in this State does not allow "another individual" to adjudicate the 
parentage of a child having a presumed father. Instead, the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, 
codified at Title 78, Chapter 45(g) of the Utah Code, allows the issue to be raised only by 
"the presumed father or the mother at any time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the 
pleadings at the time of the divorce of the parents." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607 
(2006). Individuals outside the marriage, including putative fathers, may not adjudicate the 
paternity of a child of the marriage, even at the time of the divorce of the mother and the 
presumed father. 
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In light of the foregoing expression of this State's public policy regarding the 
protection of marriage and the presumption of paternity from outside challenges, even 
during divorce proceedings, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding 
that the first prong of the Schoolcraft test should not have been dismissed by the trial court 
as irrelevant under the facts of this case. 
C. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Its Application of the Policy 
Consideration of "Protecting Children From Disruptive and 
Unnecessary Attacks upon Their Paternity" 
Petitioners again argue, in the context of the second policy consideration articulated 
by this Court in Schoolcraft, that the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it 
"rejected the unchallenged findings of the trial court and made findings of its own." Brief of 
Appellants, at 33. The essential facts in this case that bear on the policy consideration of 
protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity are clear and 
undisputed and were not rejected by the Court of Appeals. These facts are that Mother, 
Father and Thanos, with knowledge of Thanos's probable biological paternity of Zachary, 
concurred in Father taking on the role of father to Zachary, that Father did in fact take on 
that role, that Father and Zachary developed a strong father-child bond during critical 
stages in Zachary's development, that that father-child bond remained intact though Father 
and Mother subsequently separated and Thanos was introduced into Zachary's life, and that 
Zachary came to identify Thanos as "another loving caregiver", not his father. These facts 
are set forth in Dr. Sanders' "Schoolcraft" reports submitted prior to the October 1,2002 
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hearing on Thanos's motion to intervene and the parties' affidavits submitted in support of 
and opposition to the motion. See R.28, fl8; R.46, ffl[ 3-7, fl 11-12; R.75, fflj 2-8; R.860-68. 
The essential facts remained unchanged nearly two years later, when the trial court 
found that Thanos, with Mother and Father's assistance, kept Thanos's parentage of 
Zachary secret during the first 15 months of Zachary's life, that this resulted in minimal 
contact between Thanos and Zachary during this time, that Thanos and Zachary did not 
have a strong mutual bond during this critical 15-month period of time, that Thanos did not 
demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice his own interests and welfare for Zachary during this 
time, and that during this time he generally lacked the sympathy for and understanding of 
Zachary that is characteristic of parents generally (R.2452), and that "it is ironic at best to 
conclude that [Father] is a non-parent of Zachary when in real terms [Father] has 
established a strong mutual parental bond and relationship with Zachary." (R.2452-53.) 
The trial court made these findings despite the fact that Mother and Thanos had 
since married and established an "intact family unit" with Nicholas, Zachary and another 
child born to Mother and Thanos after their marriage. Though Zachary was certainly part of 
this household, Father and Mother remained Nicholas and Zachary's primary parental 
figures, while Thanos remained in a secondary, or step-parent role, to both Nicholas and 
Zachary. The testimony at trial establishing the continuing role of Father as father and 
Thanos as "another loving caregiver" or step-parent came from Petitioners' witness, Dr. Jill 
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Sanders, and was unrefuted. See R.2534. at 711:17-18; R.2534, at 718:18-20; R.2534, at 
719:7-16; R.2534, at 738:11-13; R.2534, at 796:5-9. 
The only "facts" rejected by the Court of Appeals, which Petitioners argue should 
bear on the second prong of the standing analysis are not facts at all, but speculation 
regarding the role that Thanos might play or should be able to play in Zachary's life in the 
future due to his biological paternity of Zachary. Dr. Sanders' summary opinion that "some 
relationship between a biological parent and their child is necessary for the child's normal 
development" (R.863,1f 4), which led her to conclude that "Peter's relationship with Zachary 
is necessary to Zachary's normal and positive development" (R.864, fl 4), falls in this 
category. It is not a fact, but a conclusion, based on Dr. Sanders' generalized opinion that 
all children - not Zachary Pearson in particular - must have a relationship with their 
biological parent to develop normally. If this view is translated into policy, then the second 
prong of the Schoolcraft standing analysis becomes superfluous in any case in which a 
biological father wishes to assert his paternity in a child having a presumed father. 
The Court of Appeals, correctly, did not treat Dr. Sanders' idiosyncratic view as a 
"fact" bearing on the standing analysis. It also correctly characterized Dr. Sanders' focus in 
her reports on Thanos's presence in Zachary's life, rather than Thanos's direct attack on 
Father's paternity of Zachary, and the potential that such an attack had to disrupt the 
relationship between Father and Zachary, as being nonresponsive to the second policy 
concern identified by this Court in Schoolcraft. See Pearson v. Pearson. 2006 UT App 128, 
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H 24, n.6. Dr. Sanders, in fact, attempted to avoid the whole question of disruption by 
ignoring the reality that Thanos's paternity challenge would render Father a "non-parent" to 
Zachary. Thus, Dr. Sanders opined that Zachary had not lost his relationship with Father, 
that "[t]here is no inherent reason why the presence of Mr. Thanos as another loving 
caretaker should have any further disruptive impact on Zachary's relationship with Mr. 
Pearson," R.866, fl 2, and that Thanos's intervention was an opportunity for Zachary "to 
experience two positive, important relationships with the two fathers in his life." R.864, ^ 2. 
The Court of Appeals properly rejected these views as nonresponsive to the 
question that needed to be addressed, instead focusing on Dr. Sanders' findings that were 
responsive. These findings are that "Zachary's emotional security would likely be 
significantly disrupted in the case of severely limited or complete loss of contact with 
[Father]," R.866,1| 2, that "[o]bviously, the way to protect Zachary from additional disruption 
is to maintain his relationship with [Father]," R.866, % 3, that Zachary and Father's 
relationship "is a strong and positive parent-child attachment," and that Zachary considers 
Father his father and Thanos "an additional caregiver." (R.867, ^ 2). 
Whatever the merits of Dr. Sanders' "two-father" view, the issue before the court was 
not whether Thanos could be a secondary father to Zachary. Clearly, by virtue of his 
marriage to Mother, Thanos is at liberty to attempt to foster whatever type of relationship 
with Zachary he wishes to foster, and would be expected most naturally to develop as a 
father figure to both Zachary and Nicholas. As the Court of Appeals' correctly observed, 
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however, "[t]he entire motivation for Thanos's attempt to intervene was to establish that he, 
rather than Father, was to fulfill the paternal role in [Zachary's] life." Pearson v. Pearson, 
2006 UT App 128, K 28. Thanos's challenge is not for the purpose of being introduced as 
another father figure in Zachary's life, but for the sole purpose of displacing Father as such. 
The Court of Appeals' penetration through Dr. Sanders' generalized views regarding 
biological parents and their children and her "two-father" model, and its focus instead on the 
relevant findings in her report, was clearly not error, but necessary to the proper application 
of Schoolcraft in the context of this case. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals' approach is in line with this State's clearly 
articulated policy of ensuring the early identification of persons who will be fulfilling the 
parental role for children, and the protection and fostering of children's uninterrupted 
bonding with these parents. See Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); 
InreJ.M.&N.P. , 940 P.2d 527, 539 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
In the context of children born outside of marriage, this Court has stated: 
It is and should be the policy of the law to so operate as to encourage the 
finding of suitable homes and parents for children in that need. It is obvious 
that persons who might be willing to accept a child for adoption will be more 
reluctant to do so if a consenting parent is permitted to arbitrarily change her 
mind and revoke the consent, and thus desolate the plan of the adoptive 
parents and bring to naught all of their time, effort, expense and emotional 
involvement. 
See ig\(quoting In re Adoption of F.. 488 P.2d 130,134 (Utah 1971). Moreover, our 
legislature has found: 
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(a) The state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent 
homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption 
of adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the 
needs of children; 
(c) Adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive 
placements; 
(d) Adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy 
interest in retaining custody of an adopted child; and 
(e) An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires 
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and 
upon the child's birth 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2) (2006). 
It is no less essential in the context of children born into marriage than in the context 
of children born outside of marriage to provide permanence and stability to the parent-child 
relationship. To adopt a policy that allows the legal relationship between a father and his 
three-year-old son3 to be severed by a paternity challenge from a biological father who 
demonstrated neither a timely nor full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood is to 
afford marital fathers less protection than prospective adoptive parents, and to afford 
children born into marriage less permanence and stability than children born outside of 
marriage. Marital children are entitled to the same protection and the same permanence in 
the relationships they develop with the persons who actually function as their parents as are 
non-marital children. 
3
 Zachary had just turned three when the trial court granted Thanos's motion to intervene for 
the purpose of establishing his paternity of Zachary. 
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As the trial court found, Father is Zachary's father "in real terms". R.2452. The 
Court of Appeals' application of the second prong of Schoolcraft standing analysis to the 
facts of this case ensured that Father, who has functioned as Zachary's father from birth, 
and who continues to do so, remains the child's father legally, thus protecting Zachary from 
disruption in that relationship, and ensuring Zachary the "early and swift" permanence to 
which children in this State are ideally entitled. This was not a misinterpretation of the 
policy concern that this Court articulated in Schoolcraft, of protecting children from 
disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity, but a vindication of it. 
D. Thanos Does Not have a Constitutionally Protected Right to 
Challenge Zachary's Paternity 
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals' application of the Schoolcraft analysis to 
the facts of this case resulted in a denial of Thanos's due process rights. In determining 
whether an asserted interest is a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process, the 
interest sought to be protected must first be carefully defined. See Dawn P. v. Superior 
Court of Riverside County, 17 Cal. 4*h 932,940 (Cal. 1998). In this case, the trial court 
concluded, without analysis, that "[b]oth the U.S. and Utah Constitutions grant Peter Thanos 
constitutional rights afforded to a natural parent." R.975, f 23. This description of Thanos's 
interest is inaccurate. Thanos does not claim an interest simply as an alleged "natural 
parent." He claims an interest as the alleged biological father of a child born into the 
marriage of another man who is deemed the child's father by operation of law upon birth. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2. The constitutional significance of his claim is therefore 
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distinct from that of other unwed fathers. The constitution requires some protection of the 
biological father's opportunity, which no other male possesses, to develop a relationship 
with his offspring. "Where, however, the child is born into an extant marital family, the 
natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the 
husband of the marriage." Michael H. v. Gerald P., 491 U.S. 110,129 (1989). Thus, to 
expand the "liberty" afforded Thanos is to contract the equivalent liberty of Father, or as 
Justice Scalia framed it: "[T]o provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny 
protection to a marital father." id. at 130. 
Carefully described, therefore, the interest Thanos claims is constitutionally 
protected is his interest in disestablishing Father as the legal father of a child born to 
Father's intact marriage, where the child has a fully developed and unquestioned father-
child relationship with Father, to have himself declared the father of the child. Once the 
asserted interest is identified, the court must next determine whether the interest 
denominated as a "liberty" is a fundamental right traditionally protected by our society and 
rooted in history, tradition and the conscience of our people. See Michael H. v. Gerald P., 
491 U.S. 110,123 (1989)("[T]he Pue Process Clause affords only those protections 'so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental'") 
(quoting Snvder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934)). Only if the liberty interest is 
fundamental is it necessary to conduct a complex balancing of competing interests. See 
Pawn P., 17 Cal.4'h at 940-41. 
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It is Thanos's burden to establish that the interest he has in disestablishing Father as 
Zachary's legal father to have his paternity declared is so deeply embedded within our 
traditions as to be a fundamental right. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126. He has made no 
effort to do so. The United States Supreme Court did not hold the similar claim of a 
biological father to be of constitutional significance, but instead considered the question of 
whether a state may give categorical preference to the marital father over the biological 
father to be a matter of public policy for the state to decide. See id. at 129-30.4 
4
 Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. was joined by Justice Rehnquist, and in all but 
footnote 6, by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, 
and wrote separately to distinguish the issues at hand as he saw them: first, is it 
unconstitutional to prevent Michael from obtaining a judicial determination that he is her 
biological father; and second, is it unconstitutional to deny Michael a fair opportunity to 
prove that the child's best interests would be served by granting him visitation? See 
Michael H. v. Gerald P.. 491 U.S. 110,132 (1989). As to the first question, Justice 
Stevens wrote: "I agree with Justice Scalia that the Federal Constitution imposes no 
obligation upon a State to 'declare facts unless some legal consequence hinges upon the 
requested declaration.' 'The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds.'" |d. 
at 133 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,261 (1983)). As to the second question, 
Justice Stevens assumed for the purposes of his opinion that a constitutionally protected 
family relationship might exist between Michael H. and his daughter. As distinct from this 
case, Michael H.'s daughter identified Michael as her father, calling him "Daddy" id. at 144, 
and the child's guardian ad litem asserted that she had more than one psychological or ofe 
facto father and should be entitled to maintain her filial relationship with both. Id. at 114. If 
so, Justice Stevens concluded, the relationship was sufficiently protected by California law 
that gave Michael H. the opportunity to prove his entitlement to visitation as "any other 
person having an interest in the welfare of the child." Id. at 133. Utah law also affords the 
psychological parent of a child the right to seek visitation with the child. See Gribble v. 
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). Here, intervenor does not claim to be Zachary's 
psychological parent (and it is undisputed that he is not and that petitioner is) and does not 
seek rights in Zachary on any ground other than as would ensue from a judicial declaration 
that he is Zachary's biological father. The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
federal constitution does not entitle him to such relief. 
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The question is whether the relationship between a married woman, a man married 
to another woman with whom she commits adultery, and a child born of that union into the 
extant marriage of the woman and her husband, has been treated as a protected family unit 
under the historic practices of our society. ]d. at 124. It is impossible to find that it has. 
Historically, adultery has been treated as a crime, and it remains a crime in this state. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-103. At common law, alienation of affection and criminal 
conversation were widely recognized torts, the latter being directed specifically to adultery. 
The tort of alienation of affection, by which liability may attach to a third person who 
intentionally interferes with a marital relationship, retains continued validity in this state. See 
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). 
Traditionally, society was so scornful of bringing children into the world as a result of 
adulterous conduct that "bastardy" was also a crime. Utah's Bastardy Act was enacted in 
1911 as part of the penal code and provided for the arrest and arraignment of the putative 
father. Whereas the father of a child born out of wedlock historically had no parental rights 
in his child, the husband's rights in children born to his marriage have, from ancient times, 
been protected by the presumption of legitimacy. 
Consistent with the presumption of legitimacy and vindicating similar policies, Lord 
Mansfield's Rule dates back to the common law of the eighteenth century, gained wide 
acceptance in the jurisdiction of this country, and has continued application today in this 
state. See In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). The rule forbids a husband or wife to 
34 
give testimony that would that would tend to illegitimate their child, or for a court to consider 
such evidence. See id. at 714 (holding court of appeals erred in relying on evidence that 
contravened Lord Mansfield's rule). In 1777, Lord Mansfield said: "It is a rule founded in 
decency, morality, and policy that they [husband and wife] should not be permitted to say 
after marriage that the offspring is spurious; or especially the mother, who is the offending 
party." See Lopes v. Lopes, 518 P.2d 687,691 n.3 (Utah 1974). 
It is clear that our history and traditions demonstrate a resounding repugnance for 
the conduct of fathering a child in the marriage of another man. It cannot be claimed to be a 
"right" traditionally protected by our society and rooted in the history, tradition and the 
conscience of our people. To the contrary, the conduct has been criminalized, the resulting 
biological link accorded no protection, and the child and husband of the marriage protected 
from such claims by longstanding, universally applicable laws with enduring application to 
the present day. 
Moreover, even if it were appropriate in this case to look at the liberty interest that 
the trial court identified as "rights afforded to a natural parent" in isolation from both Father's 
and Zachary's liberty interests that are necessarily implicated by those rights, which it is not, 
Thanos's claim of constitutional protection would nevertheless fail. The extent to which an 
unwed biological father's interest in parental rights in his child will acquire constitutional 
protection depends on the extent to which the unwed father "demonstrates a full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by '[coming] forward to participate in the 
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rearing of his child.'" Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). The interest the unwed 
father has is an opportunity interest, which is lost when he fails to seize the moment and 
permits another to assume the responsibility of meeting the child's needs. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.12(e) ("An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires 
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth."). 
In InreD.B.S.. 888 P.2d 875 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995), the court addressed the 
constitutional claims of a man in Thanos's position who had not promptly asserted parental 
rights in his child, but instead allowed the child's legal father to assume the role of father. 
After the mother and legal father divorced, the biological father then married the child's 
mother and argued that the relationship he subsequently developed with the child should be 
accorded constitutional protection. The Kansas Court of Appeals rejected this argument. 
The court noted that the biological father had not been prevented from developing a 
relationship with the child by the mother, but rather had agreed to "stay out of the picture." 
Id. at 884. The court held: "[Ijn agreeing to [the mother's request] to stay out of the picture, 
[the biological father] surrendered whatever constitutional opportunity he may have had to 
develop a protected relationship with D.B.S. There is no authority to support the proposition 
that having surrendered those rights he could later reclaim them by developing a stepfather 
relationship after four years of providing no parental contact or support. We are justified, as 
the United States Supreme Court did in Lehr. to hold that [the biological father's] interest in 
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[the child] came too late to preserve any constitutional liberty interest. [The legal father] 
voluntarily assumed the duties of paternity long before [the biological father] acted to secure 
any rights. Therefore, without following the plurality opinion in Michael H„ but relying on the 
total opinion of the United States Supreme Court therein, we hold the rights of [the 
biological father] herein do not amount to a liberty interest sufficient to require that he be 
granted the requested blood tests." Id. 
Even in Texas, where the Texas Supreme Court held its statutory scheme denying 
standing to an alleged biological father to assert paternity in a child born into the marriage of 
another unconstitutional under the Texas constitution, the court emphasized that the 
biological father must assert his interest near the time of the child's birth to preserve it. The 
court held: "In a situation such as that presented here where the biological father does 
assert his interest near the time of the child's birth, standing is constitutionally mandated if 
he both 1) acknowledges responsibility for child support or other care and maintenance, and 
2) makes serious and continuous efforts to establish a relationship with the child." In re 
J.W.T.. 872 S.W.2d 189,195 (Tex. 1994). 
In this state, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an unwed biological father's 
opportunity interest in parenting his child is inchoate only and requires a demonstrated and 
timely commitment to the responsibilities of parenting to warrant constitutional protection. 
Cf. Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Services. 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990) (discussing cases 
involving unwed father's opportunity interest). The fact that Thanos procreated with the wife 
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of another man, rather than an unmarried woman, does not mean that he is thereby 
afforded the luxury of choosing when he may decide it is convenient to come forward and 
assert his interests. Rather, Section 30-1-17.2 of the Utah Code operates so that a child 
born into the marriage of a man who is not his biological father is "immediately subject to a 
de facto adoption by the mother's husband." Pearson v. Pearson. 2006 UT App 128, fl 35. 
There is indeed "no reason why a man who chooses to procreate with the wife of another 
should be granted significant latitude to challenge the husband's de fact adoption, while one 
who fails to timely establish his paternity of a child born to an unmarried woman is 
permanently barred from doing so upon the mother's mere consent to the child's adoption." 
Id.; see also Dawn P. v. Superior Court of Riverside County. 17 Cal. 4th 932 (Cal. 1998) ("A 
man who wishes to father a child and ensure his relationship with that child can do so by 
finding a partner, entering into a marriage, and undertaking the responsibilities marriage 
imposes. One who instead fathers a child with a woman married to another man takes the 
risk that the child will be raised within that marriage and that he will be excluded from 
participation in the child's life."). 
In this case, Thanos, with full knowledge of Mother's pregnancy, and believing the 
child to be his from January 1999, took no steps whatsoever to come forward and shoulder 
the burdens of fatherhood during the pregnancy, nor to establish a relationship with Zachary 
after his birth. He did nothing, choosing to sit on whatever rights he may have had for two 
years, until January 2001, when he filed a motion to intervene in the Pearsons' divorce 
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action. He so conducted himself to maintain intact the deception of his wife. It was 
Thanos's choice, and no one else's, to elevate his separate interests above Zachary's. 
Though Thanos has now developed a healthy step-parent relationship with Zachary 
(and Nicholas), he cannot reclaim the lost opportunity that he may have had to come 
forward and act as Zachary's father. Zachary now has an established father, who is not 
simply a fungible item capable of replacement at the convenience of another. See In re 
Marriage of Freeman. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439,446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("The relationship of 
father and child is too sacred to be thrown off like an old cloak, used and unwanted."). The 
Court of Appeals' application of the Schoolcraft standing analysis to the facts of this case 
was not a denial of any constitutionally protected liberty interest extant in Thanos. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' REFERENCES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
OCTOBER 2001 ORDER ARE IMMATERIAL TO ITS OPINION 
Petitioners complain about two references to the trial court's October 2001 order, at 
paragraphs 25 and 26 of the opinion. Paragraph 26 refers to the findings in the October 
2001 order that Father is the psychological father of Zachary, that Zachary had become 
closely bonded with Father, that those bonds were critical, and that to permit Thanos to 
establish his paternity of Zachary and be introduced at that point as a father figure in 
Zachary's life would be disruptive to the child's stability. Paragraph 25 refers to the 
undisputed fact that Thanos had little interest or involvement in Zachary's life until he was 
approximately 16 months old, and notes that the trial court had recognized this in its 
October 2001 order. 
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Petitioners assert that these findings in the October 2001 order "were critical to the 
Court of Appeals' Motion [sic] that Pete's involvement was both unnecessary and disruptive 
to Zachary and Kelly's relationship." Brief of Appellants, at 51. This assertion is inaccurate. 
In support of it, petitioners point to paragraph 28 of the opinion, which states, "In light of 
those findings, we cannot say that Thanos's attack on [Zachary's] paternity would not have 
been disruptive to [Zachary's] paternity relationship with Father and his expectations about 
whom his father was." Pearson v. Pearson. 2006 UT App 128, fl 28 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners then make the false claim that "those findings" refers to the findings in the 
October 2001 order. A cursory review of paragraph 28 makes clear, however, that "those 
findings" refers to Dr. Sanders' findings in her May 13,2002 and August 26,2002 reports. 
With the exception of the ultimate finding, namely, that to permit Thanos to establish 
his paternity of Zachary would be disruptive, each of the findings in the October 2001 order 
is confirmed in Dr. Sanders' reports. Dr. Sanders' reports were the sole and exclusive 
supplementation of evidence between March 2002, when the trial court concluded that "the 
current record is insufficient to adequately address [the policy consideration of protecting 
children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity] as it applies to the 
circumstances of this case" - and November 2002, when the trial court concluded that 
"intervention is appropriate based upon Dr. Sanders [sic] review and report to this court in 
regard to the parties and children in this action." R.982, fl 20. The Court of Appeals was in 
as good a position as the trial court to review the reports, and did so, concluding based on 
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the findings contained therein that Thanos should not have been permitted to intervene to 
establish his paternity of Zachary, thus replacing Father as Zachary's legal father. 
Any reference by the Court of Appeals to the October 2001 order, as opposed to the 
November 2002 order, is completely immaterial, as the essential record facts remain the 
same. The trial court did not "vacate" those facts, and did not vacate its findings. The Court 
of Appeals properly applied those facts to the standing analysis set forth in Schoolcraft. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PETITIONER'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondent's petition for rehearing attempts to circumvent the plain language of the 
Court of Appeals' opinion to create ambiguity where none exists. The opinion is not about 
admissibility of evidence for one purpose or another, but legal parentage, which has 
"inescapable consequences" for the trial court's custody orders. The opinion is clear: "The 
trial court erred in applying the parental presumption in favor of Mother and against Father 
in making its ultimate custody decisions regarding Z.P. Other aspects of the trial court's 
supplemental decree of divorce also rely, explicitly or implicitly, on Thanos's paternity of 
Z.P., and these aspects of the final order are also erroneous and must be revisited as 
appropriate." Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, fflf 37-38. 
In fact, every aspect of the trial court's custody determinations stem directly or 
indirectly from the trial court's erroneous parentage determination and the presence of 
Thanos as a contestant for custody resulting therefrom. The Rule 4-903 factors addressed 
by the custody evaluator and set forth in the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 34 pertain to 
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Father, Mother and Thanos, and consistently refer to all three as parties and contestants for 
custody of not only Zachary, but also Nicholas. The legal and physical custody orders set 
forth in Findings of Fact Nos. 44 through 47 - incorporated directly from the custody 
evaluator's recommendations - award Thanos legal and physical custody rights in both 
Zachary and Nicholas, conferring on him, together with Mother, a joint physical custody 
access schedule in both children and decision-making rights in both children. Further, the 
court's application of the parental presumption against Father in his claim for custody of 
Zachary, at Finding of Fact No. 35, necessarily impacts Father's claim to custody of 
Nicholas as well because the court found that Nicholas and Zachary are "best of friends" 
and should not be separated. See Finding of Fact No. 34.b. 
Peppered throughout the trial court's findings are additional references to parentage 
of the children that clearly impacted the trial court's custody orders. An example of this is 
the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 42, which states that Mother "is pivotal in this case in 
that she is the biological mother of both boys and their sister, Madelaine." Thus, the court 
concludes, she has "the strongest inherent responsibility for all three of these children." See 
Finding of Fact no. 42. This and other similar findings - which emphasize Mother's, 
Father's, and Thanos's biological relationship with not only the children whose custody is at 
issue, but a child born to Thanos and Mother while the custody litigation was pending -
formed the basis for the court's ultimate custody determinations. 
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Mother's petition for rehearing asked the Court of Appeals to ignore the foregoing 
and pretend that Thanos's presence in the case as Zachary's legal and biological father, the 
evaluator's treatment of him as a contestant for custody of both Zachary and Nicholas and 
concomitant treatment of Father as a "third party" with less "inherent responsibility" for his 
children than Mother, made no difference in the trial court's custody orders. This argument 
is disingenuous, and it is belied by the trial court's findings and the custody orders 
themselves. 
Clearly, it is impossible for the trial court to fairly evaluate Father's custody claims 
without the benefit of a new trial and a new custody evaluation that treats only the 
competing claims of Father and Mother as legal parents with equal "inherent responsibility" 
for their two children, and equal rights of custody in their two children, and does not confer 
on Thanos or any other third party the status of parent, nor permit Thanos or any other third 
party to be evaluated as a contestant for custody of either child. Father is entitled to have 
his custody claims in Nicholas and Zachary evaluated as the legal parent of both children, 
putting him on equal legal footing in all respects with Mother. Anything less than this 
unacceptably prejudices Father. 
Petitioners' petition for rehearing also requested that the Court of Appeals "clarify" 
that the trial court may rely upon its findings and Dr. Jill Sanders' custody evaluation in 
considering revisions to its award of custody and parent-time on remand. The opinion is 
clear that the trial court's findings that rely either implicitly or explicitly on Thanos's paternity 
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are erroneous and may not be relied upon by the trial court. Nevertheless, petitioners 
asserted that the trial court should be permitted to consider the fact that she is married to 
Zachary's biological father and that Zachary's "biological sister lives with his biological 
parents." Petition for Rehearing, at 5, % 1. 
Petitioners' argument in this regard must be understood clearly. Their premise is 
that the trial court's findings are not erroneous because the trial court and the custody 
evaluator could properly consider biology in awarding custody. The premise is faulty in two 
respects. First, the trial court did not merely consider biology as a factor in its custody 
findings and orders, but structured the entire custody case around parentage determinations 
stemming from biology. Thus, the trial court allowed Thanos to participate in the litigation 
as a contestant for custody of both Nicholas and Zachary and awarded him custody rights in 
both children. This was because the trial court determined that Thanos was a parent. At 
the same time, the trial did not place Father on equal footing with Mother in his custody 
claims because it determined that Father was not a parent. The trial court's findings are 
primarily about biology as it relates to parentage, not about biology as a factor to be 
considered in determining custody. 
Biology may be relevant to determine parentage, if parentage is at issue. However, 
the Court of Appeals resolved the question of legal parentage, reversing the trial court's 
biology-based determination. Legal parentage having been determined, biology is no longer 
relevant to that inquiry. The vast majority of the trial court's findings regarding biology are 
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therefore erroneous, either implicitly or explicitly conferring upon Thanos parental rights, 
concomitant standing to sue for custody, and treating him as a full contestant for custody in 
this litigation. As such, the findings may not be relied upon by the trial court, and the trial 
court should not be instructed that they may. 
Petitioners' premise that the trial court's findings are not erroneous is based, 
secondarily, on her faulty assumption that biology is relevant to custody, independent of the 
parentage determination. The custody evaluator, and the trial court in reliance on the 
evaluator, did make findings that appear to consider biology as a factor directly relevant to 
custody, independent of parentage issues. Thus, one of the principle findings of the trial 
court - informing its award of primary custody of Nicholas to Mother - is that Mother is 
"pivotal in this case in that she is the biological mother of both boys and their sister, 
Madelaine" and that Father by implication has less "inherent responsibility" for his two 
children (being biologically related to only one) than Mother has. 
Mother should not be permitted to advance this argument on remand. Legal 
parentage having been decided, biology plays no role in the custody determination, and is 
not a factor to be considered in assessing Father's and Mother's respective custody claims 
in their two children. This Court made this point clearly in Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P.2d 
760 (Utah 1985). The father in that case made the argument that Mother now makes, i.e., 
that the trial court should have considered his biological relationship to the minor child 
whose custody was at issue, the mother having adopted the child, to elevate his custody 
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claim over hers. This Court refused to do so, stating: "The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in giving overriding priority to the best interests of the child over the desires of 
defendant. Without discounting or even questioning the strong affection defendant bears 
for his son, plaintiff, as an adoptive mother, could well harbor feelings of equal intensity." ]d. 
at 762. 
In Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), decided the following year, this Court 
emphasized that the best interests of the child analysis in custody cases should be "based 
on function-related factors," not unnecessary and outdated stereotypes, such as the 
maternal preference, jd. at 120. 
Mother's argument that "biology" may be considered in determining custody equates 
to a request that function-related factors approved by the case law of this jurisdiction over 
the past 20 years be abandoned in favor of stereotypes and pre-conceived notions. Instead 
of relying on the function-related factors that are observed within each family constellation, 
the trial court would be free to speculate about "inherent responsibility" or other such 
concepts, completely independent of each parent's actual relationship with his or her 
children. 
Petitioners argue, however, that consideration of biology is appropriate due to the 
Hutchison factors set forth in Rule 4-903, and specifically, Rule 4-903's direction that 
custody evaluators must consider "kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances 
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stepparent status." Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-903(5)(E)(vii). Petitioners misapprehend 
the meaning of "kinship" in the context of Hutchison and Rule 4-903. 
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), is a pivotal custody case in which 
this Court catalogues factors that had been appropriately relied upon in previous custody 
cases to determine the best interests of a child, citing one or more cases for each factor 
identified. In one group, the court listed several factors relating "primarily to the child's 
feelings or special needs." Id. at 41 . In the second group, the court listed several factors 
relating "primarily to the prospective custodians' character or status or to their capacity or 
willingness to function as parents." ]d. The second group includes the factor "kinship", for 
which only one case, namely, In re Cooper, 410 P.2d 475 (Utah 1966), is cited. 
In re Cooper does not stand for the proposition that biology can be considered as a 
factor in determining custody of a child between two legal parents. To the contrary, In re 
Cooper involves the competing custody claims of two sets of non-parents. This Court 
stated that in such cases, "all things else being equal, near relatives should generally be 
given preference over nonrelatives." ]d. at 475.5 
Thus, it is clear that "kinship" as a factor involves the status of the prospective 
custodian vis-a-vis the child where two nonparents are competing for custody of a child, or 
where one parent is a step-parent, not a legal parent. Where the prospective custodians' 
5
 Nor is "kinship" equated with "biology", as step-parent status is explicitly included within 
the kinship factor. 
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status vis-a-vis the child is exactly the same - i.e., they are both legal parents of the child -
kinship is not a relevant factor. 
Petitioners' request that it be treated as such anyway is contrary to Bonwich and 
contrary to the principle that best interests of the child is to be determined based on 
function-related factors. Mother should not be permitted to argue or remand, under the 
guise of "kinship", that she is biologically related to both children, whereas Father is 
biologically related to only one, and that this should somehow favor her in her custody 
claim. 
Petitioners also requested that the trial court be instructed that it may consider 
Zachary's biological relationship with Thanos and Madeleine, the child born to Thanos and 
Mother while this custody litigation was pending, in determining custody. Clearly, neither 
Thanos nor Madeleine are contestants for custody of Nicholas and Zachary. Their 
relationship vis-a-vis Nicholas and Zachary is relevant only in relation to Mother's claim for 
custody of Nicholas and Zachary. Mother should not be permitted to circumvent the Court 
of Appeals' opinion by obfuscating the clear consequences of it. 
Nor should Mother be permitted to confound Nicholas and Zachary's functional 
relationships with Thanos and Madeleine, which are relevant to the custody determination, 
with Nicholas and Zachary's biological relationships to Thanos and Madeline, which are not. 
While an evaluator and the trial court may and should look at the children's' functioning in 
both Mothers' and Fathers' homes, which will include looking at the children's relationship 
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with other individuals in those homes, this consideration has nothing to do with biology. If 
Zachary is closer with his sister than Nicholas, this can be observed and commented upon, 
and is not a question of mere speculation. "Biology" on the other hand, has no independent 
relevance to functional relationships, as relationships may correspond in importance, or not, 
with "blood ties". Consideration of "biology" as a factor can only invite speculation, which is 
why "biology" has never been identified in any case in this jurisdiction as an appropriate 
factor to be considered in resolving a custody dispute between two legal parents.6 Mother 
should not be permitted to advance the argument on remand that it should be here. 
Finally, petitioners impugn footnote 7 of the Court of Appeals opinion as 
sanctioning a balancing test between parental rights and best interests in the context 
of a custody determination. The footnote does not do so, but instead merely points 
out that best interests does not control in the context of determining paternity where 
paternity is contested. Instead, the test set forth in Schoolcraft controls, and this test 
balances both child-related and adult-related factors. Thus, a custody evaluator's 
best interests conclusions cannot be the exclusive basis for appropriate application 
of the Schoolcraft test. Moreover, the Schoolcraft test is not to be applied in 
determining custody, nor does Footnote 7 say that it should be. 
6
 It should also be noted that "kinship ties", including ties to a sibling of a subsequent 
marriage, have been held to constitute a "relatively unimportant" factor in the overall custody 
determination. Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, % 36, 989 P.2d 491. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should (1) affirm the Court of Appeals reversal 
of the trial court's ruling permitting Thanos to intervene in this case, (2) hold that Thanos 
does not have standing to challenge Zachary's paternity, (3) affirm the Court of Appeals' 
denial of petitioner's petition for rehearing, and (4) instruct the trial court on remand that 
Father is to have his custody claims evaluated in a new custody evaluation and trial wherein 
he and Mother compete for custody on equal footing and biology is not considered as a 
factor for any purpose in resolving Mother's and Father's competing custody claims. 
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